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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of TOME WCLEY, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and RuIes. 
. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-14-ST6335 IndexNo. 5000-14 
Appearances: Tonis Wdey 
Znmate No. 89-C-0389 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Collins Correctional Facility 
Middle Road 
P.O. Box 340 
Collins, NY 14034-0490 
I 
Eric T. Schneideman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Justin L. Engel, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
George B. Cere&, k, Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate currently housed at CoIlins Correctional Facility, 
comenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a deterihination of respondent 
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dated October 9,2013 to deny petitioner discretionary reIease 04 parole. The petitioner is 
serving a controlling term of 25 p a s  to life upon conviction of murder Pd degree, GM 
possession of stolen property 4* degree, grand larceny 4’ degree, and reckZess endangerment 
1‘ degree. Among the numerous arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner indicates that 
he has completed several institutional programs including Aggression Replacement Training, 
Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment and Alternative to Violence. He maintains that he 
now has a new way of thinking which he did not have in the 1980s. He maintains that he has 
a deep sense of remorse for his crimes. He argues that he has attempted to rehabilitate 
himself. For example he indicates that while institutionalized he enrolled in the Plumbers 
Apprentice Program, and obtained an Associates Degree in Applied Sciences €?om Corning 
CommuniEy College. He indicates that he has had a clean disciplinary record since 5997. He 
criticizes the Parole Board for not considering his rehabilitative efforts, including the 
foregoing,. He indicates has family support from his mather, brother and sister; and that upon 
being release he would get a job in his son’s contracting business. He would also comply 
with supervision requirements, and attend all treatment program. 
The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to establish witten procedures 
which incorporated risk and needs principles for making parole decisions, as required under 
Executive Law $ 259-c (4). He mentions that the Parole Board failed to prepare a 
Transitional Accountability Plan (“TAP”) for him. In his view, the Parole Board violated his 
right to Due Process. As part of this argument he maintains that the parole decision was 
“conclusory, arbitrary and impermissible”. In petitioner’s view, nothing in the record 
supports the Parole Board’s conclusion that he is likely to re-offend if released. He also 
argues that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors under Executive Law 6 
2 
[* 2]
2594. He asserts that the Parole Board was improperly focused on the past, ratha tban 
looking forward t~ the fum; and that the Parole Board c r ~ ~ n t h ~ e [ d ]  a pattan of [] denying 
parole solely because of his criminal record’’ which, he maintains, constitutes an unlawfhl 
re-sentencing. He contends that the Parole Boardadopted a hostile attitude towards him; and 
“impemissibly considered the heinous nature of the offense”, which did not, in his view, 
warrant a sentence of 25 years to life. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Denied - Hold 24 until October 2015 
“Parole is denied. After a review of the record and interview, 
the panel has determined that if released at this time, there is a 
reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at 
liberty without again violating the law and your release would 
be incckpatible with the welfare of society. This decision is 
based on the following factors. Your instant offenses are 
murder second, reckless endmgement first, grand larceny 
fourth, and criminal possession of stolen property fourth, 
wherein you caused the death of a female by placing a bag over 
her head. You then stole her property which included a german 
shepherd puppy, her vehicle and household items. You were on 
parole at the time of the instant offense. You record dates back 
to 1976 and includes: felonies, misdemeanors, prior violence, 
prior prison and/or jail, and faiIure at prior community 
supervision. You clearly failed to benefit from prior efforts at 
rehabilitation. Note is made by this Board of your sentencing 
minutes, COMPAS Risk Assessment, rehabilitative efforts, 
i s h ,  needs, parole pian, disciplinary record, remorse, positive 
presentation and all other required factors.” 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable , 12 1 AD3d I 1 52, I 152- 1 153 [3d 
Dept., 20141; Matter of Williams v New York State Division o f  Parole, 114 AD3d 992 [3d 
Dept., 2014; Matter of Campbell v Evans, 104 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [3d Dept., 20131). 
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Futhermore, only a “show@g of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part of the 
Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention Matter of Sifmon v 
Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], quoting Matter of Rwso v, New York State Bd, of Parole, 
50 NY2d 69,77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d 
Dept., 201 1 I). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., ZOOZ]). 
A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant 
offense, attention was paid to such factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his clean 
disciplinary record since 1997, support of his family, and his plans upon release. The Board 
noted that the COMPAS f isk Assessment ranked him as low risk of violence, arrest and 
absconding, but that his history of violence was high. 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determinatign was supported by the record. The decision was sufficiently 
detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the 
requirements ofExecutive Law 82594 (%Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 [2008]: Matter 
of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19933). It is proper and, in fact, required, that 
the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate‘s crimes and their violent nature fsee 
Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, supra; Matter of Matos v New 
YorkStateBoardofParole, 87AD3d 1193 [3dDept., 201 1I;Matter ofDudievvTravis,227 
AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history Matter of Farid v 
-3 Travis 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept.,’ 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd 
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Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each 
factor that it considered in determining the inmate‘s application, or to expressly discuss ea& 
one (see Matter of Davis v Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 [3d Dept., 20 131; Matter of MacKenzie 
v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 20121; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of 
Parole. supra; Matter of Youn~ v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 168 1,168 1 - I682 
[3d Dept., 2010J). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth 
in the first sentence of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A) & Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 
28 AD3d 859 [3d Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give 
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for 
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the 
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at Iiberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] iaw”’ (Matter of Durio v New York Strate Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [Z] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole was tantamount to a 
resentencing, are conclusory and without merit (E Matter of Bockeno v New York State 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 13‘ Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 13’ Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Demison, 13 Misc3d 12368, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 20061; Matter ofKalwasinski vPaterson, 
80AlD3d 1065,1066 [3dDept.,2011];MatterofCartervEvans, 81 AD3d 1031,1031 [3d 
Dept., 201 I]; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [3d Dept., 20121). The fact that 
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an inmate has served his or her minimutn sentence does not confer upon the inmate a 
protected liberty interest in parole release (see M: 54 AD3d I 1 14, 
1 f 15 [3d Dept., ZOOS]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether 
release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum 
term of petitioner's sentence & Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; 
&latter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 201 11; 
Matter of Cody v Debson, 33 AD2d 1141, I142 [3d Dept., 20061 Iv denied 8 NY3d 802 
120071; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3"' Dept-, 20071). 
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged vioIation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1 ,7  [ 19791; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that 
.- 
Executive Law 6 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
errpe&ttion of, releask; therefore, no constitutionally protected iiberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (&g B m a  v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [Zd Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v 
Hammock, 605 F2d661,664 [2d Ck., ~ ~ ~ ~ ] ; P ~ u ~ & ~ o v H ~ I I N I I o c ~ ,  516F SUPP 1367,1367- 
1368 [SDNY, 19811; Matter OfRusso vNew York State Bd. ofparole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76, 
supra. Matter of Gamez v Demison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of ParoIe, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
Petitioner's contention regarding respondent's failure to promulgate regulations 
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pursuant to the 20 1 1 amendments to Executive Law $259-c (4) has been reviewed by other 
courts and found to be of no merit (see Matter of Montane v Evans, 1 16 AD3d 187,200-303 
[ZO 1 41, appeal dismissed 24 N Y 3  d 1 052 [ 20 1 41; see also Matter of Sin& v Evans, 1 1 8 AR3 d 
1209, 1210 [3d Dept., 20141). 
Here, the Parole Board properly engaged in a risk and needs assessment as required 
under Executive Law 8 259-c (4), including review of the COMPAS instrument (see Matter 
of Delrosario v Evans, 121 AD3d 1152, supra; Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 
1259 [3d Dept., 20141, lv denied 24 NY3d 901 [2014]). “The COMPAS instrument, 
however, is only one factor that the Board was required to consider in evaluating petitioner’s 
request” &latter of Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 1 19 AD3d 1 107,1109 
[3d Dept., 20141). 
With regard to petitioner’s argument that the respondent failed to prepare a 
transitbud accountability plan (,,TW’) as required under Correction Law 8 7 1-a, “[t]he 
language of the statute clearly applies only to newly admitted prisoners and is prospective 
in nature” Matter of Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 1 I9 AD3d 1 107, 
1108-1109 [3dDept.,2014]). CorrectionLaw 5 71-awasenactedonMarch31,2011 and 
was effective six months thereafier & L 201 1, ch 62,§ 1, part C ,  5 I, subpart A, $6 16-a, 
49 [h]; Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, supra). In this instance, the petitioner was 
received into custody by DOCCS on April 10, 1989. As such, the respondent was not 
required to prepare a TAP. 
Lastly, the Parole Board‘s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record lsee Matter of 
Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, supra, at 1364, citing Matter of Tatta v State of New 
7 
[* 7]
York Division of ParoIe, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, Iv denied 98 M 2 d  604 [2002]). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court fmds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
l a m  procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in cumem review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order aud judgment of the Court. The original 
decisiodorcterljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decisiodorderljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved firom the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
n n I 
Dated: 
George B. Caesia, Jr. 
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